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FIFTY SHADES AND FIFTY STATES: IS BDSM A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? A TEST FOR SEXUAL PRIVACY
Elizabeth Mincer*
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Fifty Shades of Grey trilogy took the literary world by storm, selling
over 100 million copies worldwide, resulting in a film adaptation that has grossed
over $500 million internationally at the box office.1 The books, which chronicled the
erotic love story between two characters, were featured at the top of the Times Best-
seller List2 and have forged their way into popular culture.3 However, it was not the
literary scholarship that caused the books to become so popular, but the subject mat-
ter.4 Fifty Shades of Grey went beyond the classic romance novel, and delved into
the secret world of domination and submission, exposing the masses to what had
long been taboo.5
Bondage/Domination/Sado-Masochism (BDSM) can be defined as “a range of
sexual preferences that generally relate to enjoyment of physical control, psycholog-
ical control, and / or pain.”6 Studies have shown that up to 36% of all Americans
* Elizabeth Mincer is a JD Candidate at William & Mary Law School; JD expected May
2018. The author graduated from Smith College in 2013 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in
Women and Gender Studies and Psychology. The author would like to thank the local orga-
nizations that represent adult alternative lifestyles, in particular the leader of the Williamsburg,
Virginia groups, Madam Shadow (Shadow Harmon), for their help in researching and under-
standing the complex and diverse nature of this topic.
1 Julie Bosman, For “Fifty Shades of Grey,” More than 100 Million Sold, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2lo9E3e; Scott Mendelson, Box Office: “Fifty Shades of Grey”
Becomes 6th R-Rated Film to Top $500M, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2015/03/05/box-office-fifty-shades-becomes-6th-r-rated
-film-to-top-500m/#69a88e516f7a [https://perma.cc/86YD-DMZM].
2 The New York Times Best Sellers—June 24, 2012, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012), https://
nyti.ms/2Bh8g90.
3 Julie Bosman, Discreetly Digital, Erotic Novel Sets American Women Abuzz, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2u5udos.
4 See Alex Clark, Critics Hate Grey. So Why Can’t Readers Get Enough of the Dark
Side of Fifty Shades?, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2015, 19:05 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com
/books/2015/jun/28/what-el-james-grey-success-tells-us-about-future-of-fiction [https://perma
.cc/38DF-NM8X].
5 See Sari Cooper, BDSM: Fifty Shades of Grey Unplugged, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 6,
2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sex-esteem/201203/bdsm-fifty-shades-grey-un
plugged [https://perma.cc/HZ92-UU85]; see also Bosman, supra note 3; Clark, supra note 4.
6 Ali Hébert & Angela Weaver, An Examination of Personality Characteristics Associated
with BDSM Orientations, 23 CANADIAN J. HUM. SEXUALITY 106, 106 (2014). The acronym
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incorporate some form of BDSM during sexual activity,7 and yet it still remains
highly stigmatized in society.8 Given this stigma, many people choose to engage in
BDSM secretly, keeping a distinction between their public life and their private life.9
Similar to other marginalized groups, there are entire communities devoted to pro-
viding help and support to people who identify with the BDSM lifestyle.10 These
communities have created their own culture of self-policing and safety protocols,
designed to help carefully navigate the legal reality that the justice system has not
developed in a way that recognizes and incorporates BDSM.11
This manifests itself in several ways. First, many states have laws that indirectly
ban different types of BDSM practices, which has contributed to the creation of an
underground culture.12 Old laws that are on the books regulate the morality of sexual
can also include other words in its abbreviation. See BDSM—An Acronym of Acronyms, FRISKY
BUS. BOUTIQUE (Oct. 25, 2014), https://friskybusinessboutique.com/bdsm-an-acronym-of
-acronyms/ [https://perma.cc/U95X-BDH9] (describing Bondage/Discipline, Domination/Sub-
mission, and Sado-Masochism). A larger umbrella term used for taboo sexual practices is the
word “kink,” which can also include sexual fetishes. See Taylor Kubota, Sexual Fetishes:
What You Need to Know, MEN’S J., http://www.mensjournal.com/expert-advice/sexual-fe
tishes-what-you-need-to-know-20150401/the-difference-between-a-fetish-and-kink [https://
perma.cc/7FKG-YPX5] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (describing some of the most common
sexual fetishes).
7 Rose Eveleth, Americans Are More into BDSM than the Rest of the World, SMITH-
SONIAN.COM (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/americans-are
-more-bdsm-rest-world-180949703/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/K62M-ZMWA].
8 See Diane Mehta, The Rumpus Interview with Susan Wright, THE RUMPUS (May 22,
2013), http://therumpus.net/2013/05/the-rumpus-interview-with-susan-wright/ [https://perma
.cc/C38C-G2KA]. See generally NAT’L COALITION FOR SEXUAL FREEDOM, https://www.ncs
freedom.org/ [https://perma.cc/2TRR-QK7F] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (providing re-
sources for people who engage in BDSM, including an incident report and response mech-
anism for discrimination).
9 See Jillian Keenan, Can You Really Be Fired for Being Kinky? Absolutely., SLATE (Oct. 28,
2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/10/28/the_jian_ghomeshi_case_echoes_many
_kinksters_worst_fears_being_outed_and.html [https://perma.cc/29LA-33XZ] (explaining that
there are no legal protections for people who practice BDSM; therefore, people can be fired
or denied employment, putting many people in fear of being “outed” or blackmailed).
10 See, e.g., Matt Haber, A Hush-Hush Topic No More, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013),
https://nyti.ms/2lN4Fr3.
11 Tracey Clark-Flory, A BDSM Blacklist, SALON (June 2, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www
.salon.com/2012/06/03/a_bdsm_blacklist/ [https://perma.cc/SK6G-HLTY]. Communities will
use online forums to discuss consent violations in their local communities. Id. However,
methods for preventing abusers from participating in the BDSM community vary, and there
is much debate over how to address this issue. Id.
12 See Neil McArthur, It’s a Travesty that BDSM Isn’t Technically Legal, VICE (Aug. 2,
2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vdqem4/its-a-travesty-that-bdsm-isnt
-technically-legal [https://perma.cc/8W7K-XW8B]; Tamara Tabo, Fifty Shades of Legal
Liability—Legal Risks of Kinky Sex, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 13, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://above
thelaw.com/2015/02/fifty-shades-of-legal-liability-legal-risks-of-kinky-sex [https://perma
.cc/6EVB-P7J8].
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activity, putting people at risk of arrest or prosecution.13 There is nothing that legally
protects people who engage in BDSM from having their activities revealed and used
against them during other legal matters, such as divorce14 and child custody,15 which
makes them vulnerable both within the legal system and to blackmail from others.16
Furthermore, laws that strictly define domestic violence, sexual assault, and prostitu-
tion can be ill-designed for application to situations in which BDSM is involved.17
Cases that have alleged an unfair application of the law given the context of a
BDSM dynamic have made their way to the courts, both at the state and the federal
level.18 In general, at the state level, BDSM has been used as a defense to alleged
sexual assaults and misconduct, but has almost universally been rejected on appeal.19
In 2016, in a case about a university’s investigation of sexual misconduct, a federal
district court in the Eastern District of Virginia wrote that there was no right to en-
gage in BDSM activities, and went so far as to suggest that public universities could
consider BDSM to be per se sexual misconduct.20 If BDSM is unprotected as a
fundamental right, and as such can be banned or regulated by state universities, does
that also mean that states can ban or regulate BDSM as they see fit? Or does the right
to privacy, particularly the right to sexual privacy, extend to the rights of consenting
13 See Chelsea Hawkins, 14 Outdated Sex Laws that Need to Change This Year, in One
Unbelievable Map, MIC (Jan. 4, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/131616/14-outdated-sex
-laws-that-need-to-change-this-year-in-one-map#.Ai5zsU5tm [https://perma.cc/2558-89R5]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (listing, state by state, sex-related laws that are still on the books,
but that are likely unconstitutional or would not be prosecuted today). Given the changing
nature of legislation, it is possible that some of these have been repealed. For example, the
article listed Florida’s statute against unmarried cohabitation, but also mentions that earlier
that year it was repealed. Id.
14 See Daniel Haley, Note, Bound by Law: A Roadmap for the Practical Legalization of
BDSM, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 631, 649 (2015).
15 See id.; Katie Zavadski, Parents Can Lose Custody of Children Just for Being Kinky,
DAILY BEAST (June 18, 2015, 5:15 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/parents-can-lose
-custody-of-children-just-for-being-kinky [https://perma.cc/W7AG-8AHC].
16 See, e.g., id.; Haley, supra note 14, at 649.
17 See Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s “One Size Fits All” Response
to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 326 (2013) (discussing how do-
mestic violence laws often do not encompass the wide range of behaviors that are actually
domestic violence).
18 See, e.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712 (E.D.Va.
2015); People v. Davidson, No. D064880, 2015 WL 4751166 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015);
People v. Febrissy, No. C049033, 2006 WL 2006161 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006); State v. Van,
688 N.W.2d 600 (Neb. 2004). These cases will all be described in more detail later in this Note.
19 See Consent and BDSM: The State of the Law, NAT’L COALITION FOR SEXUAL
FREEDOM, https://www.ncsfreedom.org/please-login-to-kap/item/580-consent-and-bdsm-the
-state-of-the-law [https://perma.cc/FB7K-WRPP] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). This is not to
say that juries have never taken consensual BDSM into account. Given the difficulty of pro-
secuting sexual assault in general, I believe that evidence of consensual BDSM would likely
influence the jury’s decision.
20 See generally Doe, 132 F. Supp. 3d 712.
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adults to engage in BDSM? Furthermore, how should the justice system adapt to
provide for the best outcomes in legal scenarios where BDSM is involved?
Given the wide variety of practices, analyzing BDSM through a constitutional lens
becomes complicated quickly. For example, if unprotected, the state could regulate the
sexual activities of consenting adults, which seemingly goes against the right to sexual
privacy.21 However, on the opposite end, if protected as a fundamental right, states
could lose their ability to protect people from activities that involve a risk of injury
or even death.22 In order to balance both the privacy rights of individuals as well as
the state’s interest, practitioners of BDSM should be given quasi-rights protection.
This would not only provide freedom to those who wish to consent to BDSM, but also
provide protection to potential victims. Furthermore, applying a quasi-rights protec-
tion provides both fairness and flexibility when BDSM becomes an element of other
legal matters.
First, this Note will discuss the current precedent that has been set by Supreme
Court decisions on the issue of sexual privacy. This Note will then argue that, in
general, BDSM activities should be protected under the right to privacy, though with
exceptions, and should therefore be reviewed under a form of heightened scrutiny.
To determine where courts and states should draw the line under this review, this
Note will explain a test that balances the interests of consent with the risk of injury.
Finally, this Note will discuss some of the legal implications of recognizing BDSM
as a right under sexual privacy.
I. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In 1965, in the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut,23 the Supreme Court held
that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married people was unconstitu-
tional.24 This case established the precedent for the right to privacy by asserting that
even though the Constitution does not explicitly contain an amendment for privacy, it
is constructed upon the inferred combination of several constitutional guarantees.25
Not only did the Court balk at the implication that the police could investigate the
intimate relations of married people,26 but it also created the “zone of privacy” to
protect those intimate relations.27
21 See Consent and BDSM: The State of the Law, supra note 19 (discussing how the doc-
trine of sexual privacy has not been applied in a BDSM context).
22 See McArthur, supra note 12; cf. Consent and BDSM: The State of the Law, supra note
19.
23 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24 Id. at 485–86.
25 See id. at 484–85 (discussing the concept of “penumbras”).
26 See id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
27 Id. at 484–85.
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Later, the Court expanded this protection to include non-married persons in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.28 The Court gave individuals, married or not, the right to use
contraceptives, and also expanded the right to privacy to include freedom from
“unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”29 In Eisenstadt, the Court
examined two grounds for banning contraceptives for unmarried persons, deterring
fornication and protecting health, and determined that neither constituted the true
legislative purpose of the law.30 Furthermore, the Court also held that banning
contraceptives for unmarried people violated equal protection, and, given their
previous ruling that married couples could use contraceptives as a federally pro-
tected right to privacy, anyone should have the right to use it, regardless of their
marriage status.31
The next major Supreme Court case to address the right to privacy in terms of
family planning was Roe v. Wade.32 The Court held that women have the fundamen-
tal right to terminate a pregnancy before the fetus becomes viable, if they so choose.33
In their explication of the right to privacy, the Court wrote that “only personal rights
that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”34 The Court held that the right
to privacy was broad enough to encompass the decision to terminate a pregnancy,
specifically because of the potential physical or mental harm to the mother if forced
to carry a child to term.35 The Court also listed several areas of personal decision-
making that the right to privacy can extend to, including activities related to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child-rearing and education.36
28 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
29 Id. at 453.
30 See id. at 443, 448–53.
31 Id. at 443, 454–55.
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 Id. at 164–67.
34 Id. at 152 (internal citation omitted).
35 Id. at 153.
36 Id. at 152–53 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–54 (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications . . . is surely
to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” (internal citation
omitted)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing a “private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42
(1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race,” and therefore require constitutional standard of strict scrutiny); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
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The right for women to get an abortion was further strengthened in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey,37 when the Court held that not only did women have a right to terminate
a pregnancy, but that the government could not place an “undue burden” on a woman’s
access to abortion, because such a burden also violated their rights.38 The Court further
explained, in reference to abortion, that “matters[ ] involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”39
However, despite this list of activities that fall under personal privacy, all of
which tangentially relate to sex, the Court did not specify a right to sexual privacy
in Bowers v. Hardwick.40 In fact, ten years later the Court rejected the right to sexual
privacy by upholding (5–4) a Georgia law that criminalized sodomy, which included
both anal and oral sex.41 The opinion held that sodomy, specifically homosexual
sodomy, was neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history, nor implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, arguing that there is a long history of government regulation on
the basis of morality and ethical Judeo-Christian values.42 In his dissent, Justice
Blackmun pushed back against the assumption that homosexual sex was unprotected,
writing, “sexual intimacy is ‘a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality.’”43
In Bowers, the Court was forced to directly examine sexual privacy unrelated to
procreation and family planning, and determined that governments could ban certain
sexual practices between consenting adults.44
Ultimately, this doctrine was largely overturned in Lawrence v. Texas.45 The
Court examined a Texas law that banned homosexual sodomy, and found that it vio-
lated the right to privacy.46 This decision officially recognized that privacy extends
to sexual activity beyond that which is directly related to procreation.47 The recogni-
tion of the right for consenting adults to engage in sexual activity in the privacy of
their own homes should logically extend to many BDSM activities.48
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”)).
37 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
38 See id. at 876.
39 Id. at 851.
40 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
41 Id. at 196.
42 Id. at 192–96.
43 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting, ironically, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion
in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973), which held that there is no First
Amendment protection for obscene films).
44 See id. at 196.
45 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46 See id.
47 See id. at 578–79.
48 This Note will later examine the Lawrence decision in greater detail and apply it to the
rights analysis for BDSM. See infra Section III.A.
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II. BDSM AND THE LAW
A. Categorizing BDSM
Unlike sodomy, which can be defined by the state as a certain set of physical prac-
tices,49 BDSM contains such a wide variety of practices that it can be difficult to spe-
cify what exactly it is.50 One such difficulty in defining BDSM is that, though it is
generally viewed as sexual in nature, people have various motivations for practicing it,
including both spiritual and therapeutic.51 Furthermore, within specific subsets of
BDSM, individual preferences vary so much that what may be considered extreme by
one person may be viewed as “vanilla”52 by another.53 For example, some people enjoy
receiving pain, but do not want their partner to leave any sort of “mark”54 on their body,
while others will specifically ask for bruises or abrasions.55 There are people who con-
sider themselves members of a community or lifestyle, some even labeling themselves
as 24/7 practitioners of BDSM, while others limit their activities to the bedroom.56
Finally, there are people who consider their BDSM lifestyle to be central to their
identity as a person, much in the same way a person identifies with a religion or
sexuality, while others see it only as a form of roleplay, meant to “spice things up.”57
These differences make it difficult to categorize what is and is not BDSM. How-
ever, for the sake of defining BDSM for constitutional analysis, BDSM will be defined
broadly as “a range of sexual preferences that generally relate to enjoyment of physical
49 See William N. Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631,
655–66 (describing the history of sodomy laws in the United Kingdom and United States).
50 See generally JAY WISEMAN, SM 101: A REALISTIC INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1998)
(describing various BDSM practices and guidelines); Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6.
51 Margaret Nichols, Psychotherapeutic Issues with “Kinky” Clients: Clinical Problems,
Yours and Theirs, 50 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 281, 285–86 (2006).
52 Id. at 285 (using “vanilla” as a term to describe heteronormative, non-BDSM activities).
53 There is debate amongst BDSM practitioners about the concept of the “one-true-way,”
the idea that there is a specific way in which people should go about conducting their dy-
namics and activities. See MARGOT WEISS, TECHNIQUES OF PLEASURE: BDSM AND THE
CIRCUITS OF SEXUALITY 74–75 (2011); see also Lakota Phillips, Breaking Taboo: BDSM’s
No True Way, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C0g8Lo11VM
(hosting a debate with BDSM experts Eden Bradley and Ann Mayburn on authorship and the
problems with the “one true way” philosophy).
54 This is a word commonly used in BDSM communities to describe visible imprints on
the skin after engaging in BDSM activities. See, e.g., WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 307.
55 See Jennifer Marion, Please Hurt Me: A Feminist Psychoanalytic Study of Women’s
Consensual Sadomasochistic Sexual Practices, 156–57 (June 2016) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Adelphi University) (discussing the BDSM practices of three women who de-
scribed their enjoyment of pain).
56 See id. at 40–49 (describing the history of BDSM, modern community organization,
and a glossary of basic terms).
57 See e.g., id.
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control, psychological control, and / or pain.”58 This definition is flexible and diverse,
while also limiting the scope of the various practices. Given its taboo nature, in-
formation about BDSM used to be difficult to find, limited to self-published books
sold in adult bookstores.59 However, today, the internet provides a wealth of informa-
tion about BDSM, including its history, information on safety and technique, and
opportunities to network with other kinky people through community events.60
For the analysis of whether BDSM is a fundamental right protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, this Note will use the legal reasoning in the written opinion from
Lawrence v. Texas.61 There are several reasons why Lawrence provides the best
precedential legal comparison for BDSM currently available. First, unlike the other
zones of privacy listed in Roe v. Wade that are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,62 sodomy is a specific sexual activity that takes place between consenting adult
partners that is not directly related to procreation or family planning.63 Like BDSM,
the question is whether the activity itself is protected as a private act, as opposed to
the right to decide whether to have a child.64 Second, like sodomy, BDSM has a his-
tory of being viewed as immoral, taboo, and degenerate.65 BDSM, along with sodomy,
has had run-ins with the obscenity exception to the First Amendment, and even today
could be considered illegal if it is deemed too extreme.66
Third, there has been a similar history of discrimination for those in the LGBT
and BDSM communities, and a banding together to unite against the majority.67 In
fact, there is a lot of crossover between groups in terms of sexual identity and pro-
viding safe, protected spaces for engaging in certain sexual practices.68 Furthermore,
both are very careful about protecting the identities of individuals, particularly if
58 Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106.
59 Cf. JULIE PEAKMAN, THE PLEASURE’S ALL MINE: A HISTORY OF PERVERSE SEX 8–9
(2013) (discussing the difficulty of studying the history of sexual behavior).
60 The National Coalition for Sexual Freedom provides a list of online resources, in-
cluding an online glossary. See NCSF: Resource Library, NAT’L COALITION FOR SEXUAL
FREEDOM, https://ncsfreedom.org/resources/resource-library.html [https://perma.cc/VNW9
-6ERV] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
61 See 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
62 See, e.g., supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
63 See Eskridge, supra note 49, at 655–66.
64 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
65 See PEAKMAN, supra note 59, at 18–19; see also, e.g., Haber, supra note 10.
66 See, e.g., Scot A. Duvall, A Call for Obscenity Law Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 75, 75–77 nn.4, 6 (1992).
67 See generally LEATHERFOLK: RADICAL SEX, PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND PRACTICE (Mark
Thompson ed., 1991) [hereinafter LEATHERFOLK] (compiling various essays that describe
the history of gay and lesbian leather culture since the 1940s); History of Our Leather-S/M-
Fetish Subculture and Communities, AMBROSIO’S BDSM SITE, http://www.evilmonk.org/a
/stein.cfm [https://perma.cc/SKX4-UU6B] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (listing several works
that discuss the history of BDSM culture).
68 See generally, e.g., LEATHERFOLK, supra note 67.
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they are not “out” to friends and family.69 Fourth, like homosexuality, BDSM has
gained both a level of popularity and acceptance in modern media and culture, largely
due to the widespread success of the Fifty Shades of Grey trilogy.70 Fifth, engaging
in BDSM is an identity based on a sexual preference.71 Though science largely points
to sexual orientation as an immutable characteristic,72 the decision to engage in homo-
sexual sex, or more generally, sodomy, is still a choice that is made by the individ-
ual, unlike a protected status such as race or biological sex.73 This is similar to BDSM
because, regardless of whether the preference is immutable, it is ultimately a sexual
choice that is connected to a sexual identity.74
Finally, aside from the similarities between sodomy and BDSM as sexual
practices, Lawrence provides the most recent Supreme Court decision on the issue
of sexual privacy.75 Decided in 2003, Lawrence overturned Bowers and declared that
intimate, sexual acts between consenting adults fall under the protection of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via the right to privacy.76 Justice
Kennedy penned the majority opinion, declaring the right to sexual privacy.77 Justice
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that the Texas law is unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection.78 And Justice Scalia penned a scathing dissent,
listing a slew of other sexual practices that could now become legally protected as
sexual privacy, including “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.”79
Since the decision in Lawrence, at least one of Justice Scalia’s fears has come
true: same-sex marriage has been recognized as a fundamental right.80 In a 5–4
69 LGBT and BDSM communities share similar language, such as the word “out,” which
means to have disclosed one’s sexual orientation to oneself and/or others. See Guy Baldwin,
A Second Coming Out, in LEATHERFOLK, supra note 67, at 166, 177.
70 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Haber, supra note 10.
71 See generally Haber, supra note 10; Marion, supra note 55.
72 See Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability
Argument Is Necessary and How It Is Met, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 560–71 (2005–2006).
73 See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme
Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based
on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) (arguing that homosexuality
should be a protected class, though it is not recognized as one by the Supreme Court); see
also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574 (2003). 
74 This Note will later examine BDSM as a potentially protected status under Equal
Protection. See infra Section III.B.
75 See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Haber, supra note 10.
76 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–79.
77 See id.
78 Id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Texas sodomy laws unfairly
and exclusively punish homosexual sodomy).
79 Id. at 586, 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that all laws based on moral choices can
now be called into question, potentially inundating the courts).
80 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
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decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority as he did in Lawrence, deter-
mined that the Fourteenth Amendment “extend[s] to certain personal choices central
to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs.”81 Justice Scalia was right—Lawrence has opened the door to
recognizing other categories of sexual privacy.82 However, this recognition is impor-
tant to ensure justice, equal treatment, and fairness under the law.
B. BDSM and the Courts
Thus far, BDSM has not been recognized as a right by either state or federal
courts; the cases that have made it to appellate review have each involved a defendant
who argued a constitutional right to use the context of a BDSM negotiation as a de-
fense to criminal charges.83 For example, in People v. Febrissy,84 Febrissy was charged
with torture, forcible rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and infliction of corporal
injury upon a cohabitant.85 Though a jury only convicted him of the last charge, he
appealed the decision, and argued a violation of his due process rights because the
jury should have been given an instruction that “apparent consent [was] a defense to
his crime.”86 Febrissy invoked the decision in Lawrence as the basis for his claim.87
The Court of Appeals for the Third District of California rejected this argument
by determining that regardless of whether Lawrence applies, “the jury’s verdict nec-
essarily reflects a rejection of any claim that the victim consented or the defendant
reasonably could have believed in her consent. Therefore, in the absence of full and
mutual consent, the conviction does not transgress any protected liberty interests under
the federal Constitution.”88 There, the court avoided the analysis of whether the right
to BDSM applied to that case because, either way, there was no consent. Would there
have been a different outcome if a more viable consent claim hypothetically existed?
Another appellate court in California rejected this argument. In People v.
Davidson,89 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of California held that there
was no error in a trial court’s denial of a jury instruction that consent to BDSM
activity was a defense to charges of torture and threats to kill.90 In that case, the jury
81 Id. at 2597.
82 Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2604–05.
83 See generally Haley, supra note 14 (arguing for the constitutional right to assert BDSM
negotiations as a defense to certain crimes).
84 No. C049033, 2006 WL 2006161 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006).
85 Febrissy engaged in a videotaped session of BDSM activity that involved hitting the
victim with various instruments and then having sexual intercourse. Id. at *1–2.
86 Id. at *1.
87 Id. at *5.
88 Id.
89 No. D064880, 2015 WL 4751166 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015).
90 Id. at *7–9.
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found the defendant, Davidson, guilty of torture, injury to a cohabitant, and making
criminal threats.91 There, the court categorically denied the right to use consent as
a defense to “conduct involving serious bodily injury and terrorizing threats, even
when based on a claim of consensual sadomasochistic activity.”92 The Court in
Davidson did provide an important caveat, writing:
The jury was of course free to consider the BDSM evidence when
deciding whether the prosecution had proven all the elements of
the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; however, it was
not required to evaluate whether the victim’s consent rendered
the seriously injurious and threatening conduct lawful even if the
elements of the offenses were otherwise proven.93
As acknowledged by the court in Davidson, evidence of a BDSM dynamic can be
an important weighing mechanism for the jury.94 For example, though evidence was
presented that the victim had consensually engaged in BDSM previously, the jury
still found Davidson guilty of multiple crimes.95 In contrast, Febrissy was acquitted
of torture, rape, and assault with a deadly weapon, even though his actions had been
videotaped.96 Despite the legal rejection of BDSM as a defense, the reality is that
juries have considered alternative contexts for consent.97
Though the two previously mentioned cases were not officially published by the
California courts, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has publicly weighed in on the
issue of applying Lawrence to cases involving BDSM; in State v. Van,98 the defen-
dant, Van, was convicted of first-degree sexual assault, first and second-degree as-
sault, false imprisonment, and terroristic threats.99 The court held, “[w]e find nothing
91 Id. at *3. Davidson had been abusing his girlfriend for several months before she left.
Id. at *1–2. The victim testified that she had engaged in consensual BDSM activities in the
past with another partner; however, Davidson was emotionally unstable and would do things
to her without her consent. Id. at *1–3. Eventually she fled and reported him to police for
domestic violence. Id. at *2–3.
92 Id. at *7–9 (outlining a litany of cases where lack of consent is an element of the crime
and where lack of consent is not an element, ultimately holding that torture, injury to a co-
habitant, and criminal threats fall in the latter category).
93 Id. at *8.
94 See id.
95 Id. at *3–9.
96 People v. Febrissy, No. C049033, 2006 WL 2006161, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19,
2006).
97 See supra notes 19, 93 and accompanying text.
98 688 N.W.2d 600 (Neb. 2004).
99 Id. at 626. The victim was engaged in a consensual “master/slave” relationship as a sub-
missive to his dominant male partner. Id. at 608–09. The victim negotiated, with the knowledge
of his partner, to engage in a consensual kidnapping by Van, who would also torture and
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in Lawrence to even remotely suggest that non-consensual sexual conduct is consti-
tutionally protected under any circumstances or that consent, once given, can never
be withdrawn.”100 The court also held that all attempts to do physical violence were
unlawful, that a person could not consent to an unlawful assault, and that the Nebraska
assault statutes did not refer to consent.101 Furthermore, the false imprisonment and
terroristic threat statutes, like the assault statutes, were not unconstitutional as applied
to Van because the object of the statutes was to protect citizens from injury.102 In Van,
the Court highlighted two important factors when analyzing the question of Van’s
constitutional claims: consent and injury.103 As will be argued later in this Note,
these two factors are the crux of the holding in Lawrence, and are the standards that
should be used when analyzing future cases, though with more flexibility than an
outright rejection of the legality of BDSM, which has been seen at the state level.
Recently, the constitutional claim has also been rejected at the federal level; in
Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University,104 a student, Doe, was found
guilty of sexual misconduct and sued his public state university for a violation of his
right to due process.105 Doe argued, in part, that he had a fundamental right under
substantive due process to practice BDSM, and that the school was legally obligated
to adjudicate his sexual misconduct charge within the context of BDSM.106 Though
the district judge found in Doe’s favor under a procedural due process violation, the
judge also addressed the sexual privacy argument.107 The court relied on the analysis
in Washington v. Glucksberg,108 which held that for a fundamental liberty interest
to be judicially enforceable, the liberty interest must be “deeply rooted in the na-
tion’s history” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”109 The court then
determined that BDSM did not meet these requirements and therefore Doe did not
have a liberty interest at stake when participating in BDSM activities.110
This Note does not argue against the outcome in each of these cases. However,
the legal argument that sexual privacy does not extend to BDSM activities has the
potential to result in erroneous decisions that are against the interests of justice.
punish him. Id. at 610. The victim testified that though the arrangement with Van was ini-
tially consensual, at some point he revoked consent and was held against his will. Id. at 610–12.
100 Id. at 614.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 615.
103 See id. at 613–15.
104 149 F. Supp. 3d 602 (E.D. Va. 2016).
105 See id. at 608.
106 Id. at 631–34.
107 Id. at 617–22, 631–34.
108 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
109 Doe, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
110 Id. (“There is no basis to conclude that tying up a willing submissive sex partner and
subjecting him or her to whipping, choking, or other forms of domination is deeply rooted
in the nation’s history and traditions or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”).
2018] FIFTY SHADES AND FIFTY STATES 877
BDSM should not be used as a blanket defense. At the same time, however, adults
should have the right to engage in consensual BDSM activities without fear of an
overzealous prosecutor.
III. BDSM AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Why BDSM Should Be Protected Under the Right to Privacy
In the majority opinion in Lawrence,111 the Court held that Texas could not
outlaw homosexual sodomy.112 In order to come to this conclusion, it first described
the precedents set by Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade, each of which found that
“the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension
of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”113 Then, the Court
walked through the analysis of Bowers, which had held that sodomy was not protected
under the right to privacy, and determined that the Bowers Court had “misapprehended
the claim of liberty there presented to it,”114 and therefore decided incorrectly.115
Before engaging in their analysis of the Bowers decision, the Court first de-
scribed a general rule for state regulation of sexual activity:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their
penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching conse-
quences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The stat-
utes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.116
There, the Court was describing the relationship between regulating the sexual
activity and regulating peoples’ relationships with one another, in the context of
homosexuality, and wrote that states should avoid legislating in this area.117 As a
general rule, this can also apply to BDSM; for example, a popular practice within
BDSM is domination/submission, otherwise known as power exchange, in which
one person chooses to give up control to another person.118 Within this practice,
111 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112 Id. at 578–79.
113 Id. at 565.
114 Id. at 566–67.
115 Id. at 567–78.
116 Id at 567.
117 Id.
118 See generally WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 245.
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sexual partners may choose to engage in what is called consensual non-consent, where
it is pre-negotiated to participate in certain activities, even if the other person verbally
denies consent while the activity is taking place.119 Laws that criminalize this prac-
tice would therefore not only regulate the activity, but would also regulate the relation-
ship dynamic that exists between the partners. However, the Court in Lawrence did
qualify this general rule to exclude relationships where people are injured.120 Though
this exclusion is important to help protect people from domestic violence and sexual
assault, it also implies that states can regulate a sexual activity if there is injury to
the person,121 the risks of which can be inherent for certain types of BDSM play.122
Next, the Court delved into the analysis of Bowers; first, it examined the determi-
nation that consensual sodomy is not deeply rooted in history and tradition.123 The
Court reasoned that, though centuries of American law had banned certain non-pro-
creative sexual activities, such as “sodomy, buggery, and crime[s]-against-nature,”
actual prosecutions between consenting adults were quite rare, likely given the private
nature of the activities.124 This implied a quiet acceptance of the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, even though officially it was forbidden.125 Furthermore, though
historically homosexuality had been publicly condemned as immoral by American
society, the Court quoted Casey, stating, “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code.”126 The Court also pointed to the emerging
legal trend before, during, and after Bowers of states removing laws that regulated
private, sexual decisions made by consenting adults.127
Applying this standard to BDSM would likely result in a similar outcome. First,
unlike sodomy, BDSM has not been explicitly banned in and of itself.128 Arguably, a
person could be charged with a crime against nature, or charged with battery or sexual
assault; however, prosecutions for consensual BDSM would likely have been exceed-
ingly rare.129 Furthermore, given the number of people who engage in or fantasize
119 See id. at 47–49.
120 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578.
121 See id.
122 See generally WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 307; Marion, supra note 55.
123 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
124 Id. at 568–76.
125 See id.
126 Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
127 Id. at 572 (“In 1955 the American Law Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code
and made clear that it did not recommend or provide for “criminal penalties for consensual
sexual relations conducted in private.” It justified its decision on three grounds: (1) The pro-
hibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct many people engaged in; (2)
the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3) the laws were arbitrarily
enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail.” (internal citations omitted)).
128 See supra notes 10–17, 19 and accompanying text.
129 It is difficult to know how many of these cases would have existed. In modern cases,
BDSM is usually brought up as a defense to sexual assault. See, e.g., supra Section II.B.
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about some aspect of BDSM,130 there would likely be even more of a quiet acceptance
of the right for adults to privately engage in those activities. BDSM shares a similar his-
tory with homosexual sodomy of being decried as immoral and taboo by leaders within
society, evidenced by obscenity laws which have banned public depictions of people
engaging in BDSM.131 However, like homosexuality, there has been a growing accep-
tance of BDSM activities and culture, which have resulted in a relaxing of those
obscenity laws and an increase of people openly admitting that they have a kink or a
fetish.132 One issue that does separate BDSM from the legal acceptance of homosex-
ual sodomy is, again, the risk of injury or harm.133 Certain activities, in particular the
infliction of pain, cannot only leave marks on the body, but if done incorrectly can also
result in serious injury, permanent disability, or even death.134 Therefore, even though
moral outrage may not constitute a good reason to regulate BDSM, the fact that peo-
ples’ health and safety could be at risk is a legitimate justification for criminalization.
The Court, in Lawrence, also examined the liberty interests at stake for homo-
sexual sodomy; again, it quoted Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life.135
130 See Tanya Bezreh et al., BDSM Disclosure and Stigma Management: Identifying Op-
portunities for Sex Education, 7 AM. J. SEXUALITY EDUC. 37–61 (2012) (citing studies that
illustrate the prevalence of BDSM); see also Eveleth, supra note 7.
131 See RICHARD F. HIXSON, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE JUSTICES: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE INTRACTABLE OBSCENITY PROBLEM 146–56 (1996) (discussing the standards used to
determine what is obscenity, including the “Miller Test”); see also, e.g., PEAKMAN, supra
note 59, at 8–9.
132 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73; Tim Wu,
American Lawbreaking: How Laws Die, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2007, 7:29 AM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/features/2007/american_lawbreaking/how
_laws_die.html [https://perma.cc/3YW3-ABZF] (“Over the last decade, and without repeal
of a single law, the United States had quietly and effectively put its adult obscenity laws into
a deep coma, tolerating their widespread violation with little notice or fanfare.”). Though
over the past decade there has been a relaxing of obscenity prosecutions, very recently, now
Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, indicated during his confirmation hearings that he may be
more proactive about investigating obscene material. Sessions Hearing: Obscenity, C-SPAN
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4644425/sessions-hearing-obscenity [https://
perma.cc/2R94-5AFW]; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–77.
133 See generally WISEMAN, supra note 50; Marion, supra note 55.
134 Russell Goldman, Love Hurts: Sadomasochism’s Dangers, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4285958&page=1 [https://perma.cc/T377-G5C2].
135 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
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The Court concluded that the right to engage in homosexual activity is one that per-
tains to personal dignity and autonomy, and that banning homosexual sodomy would
deny a right that is at the heart of the concept of liberty.136
Applying this standard to BDSM would likely result in a similar finding. How
a person experiences sexual pleasure with their partner would likely be considered
an intimate and personal choice that defines one’s own existence in the same way
that engaging in homosexual sex is a manifestation of a person’s sexual identity. There
are many people who consider BDSM to be both a defining feature of their identity
and also the foundation of their romantic and sexual relationships with others.137
People also use BDSM therapeutically or spiritually to heal past trauma or better
connect with other people and their surroundings.138 Therefore, there is a strong
liberty interest in allowing people to engage in taboo sexual practices within the
privacy of their own home and with other consenting adults.
The majority opinion in Lawrence overturned Bowers and affirmed the exis-
tence of a right to sexual privacy by quoting the Bowers dissent, which stated that
immorality is not a sufficient justification for prohibiting sodomy and that decisions
concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, regardless of whether it concerns
procreation, or whether people are married, are a liberty interest protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.139 The Court in Lawrence then proceeded to explain:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual con-
sent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without interven-
tion of the government.140
136 Id.
137 Meg Barker et al., Kinky Clients, Kinky Counselling? The Challenges and Potentials
of BDSM, in FEELING QUEER OR QUEER FEELINGS? RADICAL APPROACHES TO COUNSELLING
SEX, SEXUALITIES AND GENDERS 106–24 (Lyndsey Moon ed., 2008). It is important to note
that this book was published before the DSM V was published, which removed BDSM from
its list of pathological disorders in 2010. See Merissa Nathan Gerson, BDSM Versus the DSM:
A History of the Fight that Got Kink De-Classified as Mental Illness, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/01/bdsm-versus-the-dsm/384138/ [https://
perma.cc/K6TG-3CPV].
138 See generally BROKEN TOYS: SUBMISSIVES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS & NEUROLOGICAL
DYSFUNCTION (Del Tashlin & Raven Kaldera eds., 2014) (discussing how dominant partners
can use power exchange and BDSM to help their submissive partners cope with, or heal from,
mental illness); Nichols, supra note 51, at 285.
139 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
140 Id. at 578.
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This statement appears to express the rule for sexual privacy created by the Court.
When adults choose to engage in a sexual practice with mutual consent, that private
sexual conduct cannot be criminalized by the state, especially if that sexual practice
is a part of the person’s identity.
Using this rule in isolation would likely result in a finding that supports BDSM
as a fundamental right. First, BDSM does not depend inherently on the participation
of people under the age of consent, because the sexual activities for BDSM partici-
pants could be subject to the same age restrictions that apply to non-BDSM sexual
contact. The issue of “full and mutual consent” is slightly more complicated, though
it is possible to compare the ability to consent to BDSM to a number of other activities
that can also lead to injury.141 However, in general, even when people are practicing
“consensual non-consent,” which is when partners negotiate to remove the require-
ment of consent for certain activities, it is common practice for there to be a “safe-
word” which is meant to be a substitute for revoking consent.142 Therefore, BDSM
would likely meet the requirement of full and mutual consent.
Finally, many people who engage in BDSM do consider it an important part of
their lives and identities.143 For the state to intervene in their private relationships and
criminalize intimate and sexual conduct would likely violate the liberty interest that
people have for defining and manifesting their own identity.144 The criminalization
and prosecution of people for their private sexual activities would demean their ex-
istence by outing them to their friends and family, putting them on public display,
and categorizing their actions as immoral and wrong.
However, this rule was not written in isolation; the Court buffered sexual privacy
with several implied exclusions.145 First, it described the issues that were not in play
with the Texas sodomy law: “The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution.”146 The Court also made a determination in terms of the judicial review
for the Texas law that regulated homosexual sodomy, writing, “[t]he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.”147
141 See Michele C. Nielson, Beyond PREA: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Evaluating
Sexual Violence in Prison, 64 UCLA L. REV. 230, 248–54 (2017).
142 WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 52–55. For example, partners may negotiate that even if
they say the word “no” or “stop,” the other person may continue the activity if they so choose.
Id. However, if they say the word “red,” which is a common safe word, the activity must
cease immediately, because consent has been revoked. Id.
143 See generally Barker et al., supra note 137.
144 See generally id.; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
145 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating Lawrence did not address minors or those who
might be coerced or injured).
146 Id.
147 Id.
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Though the Court did not specifically address whether BDSM is a fundamental
right, these qualifiers suggest that the Court intended to limit the extent of sexual
privacy, without explicit line-drawing. First, rather than stating that the privacy is
limited by the listed exclusions, the Court wrote that these issues simply were not
at play when analyzing homosexual sodomy.148 Therefore, it did not make an official
determination that the possibility of injury, coercion, or non-consent are automati-
cally unprotected. This complicates the realm of legal analysis for BDSM because
it could arguably cut both ways in terms of precedent. On one hand, it appears that
the Court is attempting to differentiate between harmful (unprotected) and harmless
(protected) sexual activities, which could set a precedent that BDSM is unprotected.
On the other hand, the careful balancing act of excluding certain activities could
mean that there may be other potential areas of sexual privacy that the Court did not
wish to address in the context of homosexuality because they are more controversial.
The Court in Lawrence also determined that anti-sodomy laws did not further
any legitimate state interest.149 The Court would not likely come to the same conclu-
sion for BDSM, because the state does have a legitimate interest in protecting the
health and safety of its population.150 Not all of the activities involved in BDSM
involve an inherent risk of injury, particularly when time-tested safety precautions
are in place and followed correctly.151 However, risk can never be eliminated com-
pletely, and accidents do happen.152 For example, bondage can involve the restriction
of blood flow, domination can lead to an abuse of power and psychological harms, and
sadomasochism, which directly involves the infliction and reception of pain, can
result in serious bodily injury, including broken bones.153 If the state wanted to regu-
late or ban certain practices within BDSM, it would likely succeed in the argument
that there is a legitimate state interest in preventing physical and psychological harm.
However, states cannot eliminate all risk for every activity; even non-BDSM
sexual activity can result in injury or infection.154 For example, sexually transmitted
infections (STIs) are prevalent in the United States amongst adults,155 yet this is not a
justification for the state to ban sex. Rather, it requires a more nuanced legal response.
To continue with the STI example, states can require disclosure and consent, as well
as legal recourse for victims of purposeful and malicious exposure.156 However,
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (stating
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the life of women in abortion cases).
151 See WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 305–07.
152 See id. at 305.
153 Id.
154 See generally, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE & PREVENTION, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DIS-
EASE SURVEILLANCE 2015 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/std/stats15/std-surveillance-2015
-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WS3-QW7K].
155 E.g., id. at 1–2.
156 See generally PUB. HEALTH RESEARCH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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despite the risk of injury, adults have the right to privately engage in sexual activity
with consenting partners.157 Lawrence provides this protection and therefore these
justifications are not sufficient to allow states to ban or regulate BDSM without
some form of heightened scrutiny.158
B. Why BDSM Is Not Likely Protected Under Equal Protection
The Lawrence opinion also addressed the issue of Equal Protection.159 The Texas
law specifically banned homosexual sodomy, but not opposite-sex sodomy, and there-
fore, there was another Fourteenth Amendment argument that challenged the constitu-
tionality of same-sex sodomy laws.160 The Court agreed that there was a strong
argument for equal protection in this case, but chose to directly overturn Bowers in
order to emphasize the importance of privacy.161
However, O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence addressed some of the sub-
stance of the equal protection claim.162 First, O’Connor drew a distinction between
the Georgia sodomy law in Bowers that banned sodomy, and the Texas law that
banned homosexual sodomy, stating that although morality can serve as a justifica-
tion for rational basis review, morality may not be used to justify treating one group
of people differently from another.163 Highlighting the rule, she wrote, “the State
cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for punishment that does not
apply to everyone else, with moral disapproval as the only asserted state interest for
the law.”164 O’Connor did not recognize homosexuals as a protected class, and wrote
that states could treat heterosexual and homosexual people differently for other
reasons.165 However, she drew the line at criminalizing homosexuality.166
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the equal protection of homo-
sexuals was Obergefell v. Hodges.167 Like in the majority opinion for Lawrence and
O’Connor’s concurrence, the Court did not affirm that gay people were a constitu-
tionally protected class.168 Instead, the Court found that there is a fundamental right
STATE STATUTES EXPLICITLY RELATED TO SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2013 (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/std/program/final-std-statutesall-states-5june
-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK6V-YLTK].
157 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
158 See id. at 578–79.
159 Id. at 574–75.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 574–79.
162 Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 583.
164 Id. at 584.
165 Id. at 585.
166 Id.
167 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
168 See generally id.
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to marriage, and prohibiting access was a violation of the right to due process.169
Defining the right to marriage, the Court wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment “ex-
tend[s] to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, includ-
ing intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”170 Obergefell greatly
expanded the concept of liberty by including identity and self-definition as a funda-
mental right, as opposed to the more narrow view in Glucksberg that it must be
deeply rooted in history and implicit in ordered liberty.171
Given these legal precedents, and the fact that the Court was unwilling to recog-
nize homosexuality as a constitutionally protected class of people, it is highly unlikely
that practitioners of BDSM would be given protected status. Though homosexuality
and BDSM do share some characteristics, they are also quite different. Speaking in
generalities, homosexuality is an identity based on sexual attraction,172 whereas BDSM
is an identity based on sexual practices.173
If a person were to argue for equal protection based on their BDSM practices,
they would have to overcome several hurdles. First, they would have to qualify as
a protected class by showing that their sexual preferences are an immutable charac-
teristic, that their group has suffered a history of discrimination, and that they lack
political power.174 Next, they would have to show that the state is engaging in some
form of line-drawing, treating them differently based on their collective identity.175
Finally, they would have to show that laws banning or regulating BDSM activity
would not pass heightened review.176
There is some evidence to support a genetic or biological predisposition for sexual
preferences, and specifically for certain types of kinks and fetishes.177 The mythol-
ogy behind a preference for BDSM either being a result of a psychological disorder,
or being a psychological disorder itself, has largely been debunked, and it has since
been removed from the DSM V.178 Furthermore, studies have shown that some
people are just naturally aroused by certain things and others are not,179 which means
169 See id. at 2605.
170 Id. at 2597.
171 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Three Voices of Obergefell, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2015,
at 28, 32–33.
172 See generally Balog, supra note 72.
173 See generally Barker et al., supra note 137.
174 See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
146–47 (2011) (discussing the factors used to measure the suspectness of a particular group
and how these factors are often ill-defined, duplicative, and inconsistent).
175 Id. at 146, 150–53.
176 Id. at 136–37.
177 Nichi Hodgson, The Science of What Excites Kinky People Doesn’t End with Armchair
Psychology, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2015/feb/14/science-bdsm-kink-biology-psychology-fifty-shades [https://perma.cc/CWT8
-8U8V].
178 See Gerson, supra note 137.
179 Cf. Meredith L. Chivers et al., Agreement of Self-Reported and Genital Measures of
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that it is possible that enjoying certain kinks or fetishes is an immutable characteris-
tic, one that people are biologically or genetically predisposed to.180 However, unlike
race, which cannot be changed, a preference for kink is just that: a preference.181 If
homosexuality has not been determined to be a protected class, despite decades of
scientific evidence indicating that sexual orientation is something people are born
with,182 it is unlikely that BDSM would qualify. Therefore, it makes more sense to
conceptualize BDSM as a privacy right under substantive due process.
IV. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND STATE INTERESTS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR BDSM
BDSM poses a unique issue in terms of sexual privacy. Unlike other sexual acts
that people would consider private, most notably the right to engage in sodomy,183
BDSM has a different set of risks.184 Therefore, it goes beyond the scope of the pro-
tections directly afforded in Lawrence, because the state has a compelling interest
in protecting the physical well-being of its citizens.185 At the same time, however,
intuitively many people would likely feel that what happens in the bedroom between
consenting adults should stay in the bedroom. For example, should the state be
allowed to criminalize hickies?
Therefore, to balance the rights of individuals and the interests of the state,
BDSM should qualify as a right to sexual privacy under Lawrence, and the courts
should use a heightened level of scrutiny to analyze whether a state has violated that
right, while still leaving room for states to be able to regulate very risky or injurious
actions. The following test balances the level of consent and injury involved in the
activity to determine whether it passes this heightened level of scrutiny.186 This test
has been designed to apply to any activity that a person may assert is a protected
right under sexual privacy.
Sexual Arousal in Men and Women: A Meta-Analysis, 39 ARCHIVES SEX BEHAV. 5 (2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20049519 [https://perma.cc/3PQK-HXPR] (conducting
a meta-analysis of studies about sexual arousal which found gender differences in what is
sexually stimulating).
180 See Tess M. Gemberling et al., BDSM As Sexual Orientation: A Comparison to Lesbian,
Gay, and Bisexual Sexuality, 1 J. POSITIVE SEXUALITY 56 (2015).
181 Cf. Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106 (“BDSM refers to a range of sexual
preferences . . . .”).
182 See generally Balog, supra note 72, at 571.
183 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
184 See generally WISEMAN, supra note 50; Marion, supra note 55.
185 Cf. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (stating in a case concerning
warrantless breath tests incident to arrest for drunk driving, the state has a “paramount in-
terest” in public highway safety (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979))).
186 See infra Table A for a simplified illustration of this test.
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A. Threshold
For an activity to qualify for protection under sexual privacy, there are certain
elements that must be present. These elements have been mentioned in all of the
major Supreme Court opinions that have addressed the issue of the right of the
individual to make decisions about their personal, sexual choices.187
First, the people who are participating in the activity must be adults; that is, at
or above the age of consent for their jurisdiction.188 Not only has the Supreme Court
emphasized in the major privacy cases that the people involved in the activity—in
particular the right to engage in oral or anal sex—are adults,189 but legal jurispru-
dence has long held that children do not have the same rights as adults.190 Further-
more, children receive special protection for sexual activity because of the potential
for sexual abuse.191 Though it is theoretically possible that children do have a right
to some form of sexual privacy, that has yet to be recognized and is generally left
to the states to determine.192
Second, for an act to be protected under the precedent of sexual privacy, it must be
private.193 Here, the distinction can be drawn by differentiating private acts from public
acts. In Griswold, when the Court first recognized any concept of sexual privacy, it de-
termined that substantive due process creates “zones of privacy.”194 Comparing the right
to privacy with a case about search and seizure rights, the Court in Griswold described
187 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (“The petitioners were adults at the time of the
alleged offense. Their conduct was private and consensual.”).
188 See, e.g., id. at 564, 567, 577 (discussing protected private conduct as between con-
senting adults).
189 Id.
190 See, e.g., J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273–75 (2011).
191 See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Reason,
22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 4–40 (1997).
192 See Joanne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?,
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951 (2011) (describing the privacy interests and constitutional rights
of a person under the age of majority). Sexual privacy rights for children can be a contro-
versial topic. For example, access to birth control or abortion vary by state, as does the age
of consent and the age at which someone can engage in specific types of sexual activity. For
example, New Hampshire differentiates between penetrative and non-penetrative sex. See
Mark Joseph Stern, The Odd Sexual-Consent Law that Explains the Bizarre Owen Labrie
Verdict, SLATE (Aug. 28, 2015, 5:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/08
/28/owen_labrie_verdict_it_s_confusing_because_of_a_new_hampshire_sexual_consent.html
[https://perma.cc/PLV5-CH8D].
193 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“Such a law [referring to the
forbidding of contraception] cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied
by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’” (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288, 307 (1964))); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
194 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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it as “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”195 Therefore, places where
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy that are shielded from public view,
specifically within their home or dwelling, would qualify as a zone of privacy.196
Finally, the act must be sexual or recognized as a category of BDSM. Originally,
the right to privacy was predicated on the right to decide whether to procreate.197 Im-
plied in this right is the ability to have non-procreative sex, which became the basis
for sexual privacy in general, eventually extending to the right to engage in sodomy.198
When describing this right, the Court has relied on the concept of intimacy; in Casey,
which was quoted in Lawrence, the Court defined the decision as a “matter[] involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices.”199 In Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers, he
referred to it as “sexual intimacy.”200 Finally, the Court in Lawrence referred to it as
“private sexual conduct.”201 However, the Court has not defined what exactly is “sex-
ual” when it comes to protecting privacy rights.202
What is and is not sexual is extremely subjective and individualized. For example,
“sexual” can be defined as physical conduct, which is contact with sexual organs such
as the genitalia and breasts.203 Sexual can also be used to describe the gratification
or pleasure received from some form of stimulation.204 However, there are activities that
involve physical contact with the genitals that are not sexual (i.e., a doctor’s exam)
and activities that can lead to sexual gratification that might not traditionally be seen
as inherently sexual (i.e., spanking). Furthermore, though BDSM is largely considered
to be sexual, and is even defined as such,205 many of the activities are not inherently
sexual activities, and there are many people who engage in BDSM whose primary
focus is something other than sexual gratification.206
However, what does seem to be key is the concept of “intimacy.” Intimacy is the
closeness created through shared experience.207 Intimate choices are the choices that
195 Id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
196 See, e.g., id.
197 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
198 See id. at 574 (concluding that the right to engage in homosexual activity was one of
personal dignity and autonomy and a choice central to liberty).
199 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
200 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
202 See, e.g., id. at 568, 573, 578 (referring throughout the opinion to vague notions of
“homosexual conduct,” “sexual conduct,” “sexual practices,” and “relevant conduct,” but thus
not explicitly defining what “sexual” is or means). The Court does refer to sodomy, but it is
clear that the protection of privacy relating to sexual conduct is more expansive. Id. at 578.
203 See, e.g., P.R. Abramson, (Healthy) Human Sexuality, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL
HEALTH 301, 301–04 (Howard Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2016).
204 Id.
205 Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106.
206 See Nichols, supra note 51, at 285–86. See generally Barker et al., supra note 137.
207 Barry F. Moss & Andrew I. Schwebel, Defining Intimacy in Romantic Relationships, 42
FAM. REL. 31, 31–32 (1993) (explaining the various ways in which intimacy can be defined).
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individuals make about their bodies and their physical autonomy in connection to
others.208 Therefore, to restrict sexual privacy only to those acts which are physically
and overtly sexual would exclude other intimate acts and choices that evoke the same
issue of respect for bodily autonomy. To ensure the inclusivity of the various range
of practices under BDSM, to qualify for protection, acts should be either sexual or
a recognized category of BDSM.209
B. Consent
Once an activity meets the required threshold elements, the next step for the
courts is to determine whether all of the people involved are fully consenting. States
have various configurations of what qualifies as consent for sexual activity.210 Several
different configurations of consent include “no means no” laws, which state that if
a person indicates that they do not consent to sexual contact either orally or physi-
cally, then a sexual assault has taken place.211 Other states have “affirmative consent”
laws, which state that “yes means yes.”212 These laws require that a person obtain
consent before engaging in any sort of sexual contact.213 A lot of progress has been
made in the legal construction of qualifying consent and non-consent, however, laws
are far from perfect in their application. Many sexual assaults still go unprosecuted,
and success rates for prosecutions are lower than for other types of crimes.214
BDSM can further complicate legal constructions of consent because of the prev-
alence of “consensual non-consent” play. In this category of BDSM, people negotiate
208 Id.
209 To determine whether an activity is a recognized category of BDSM, states and courts
can rely on experts in the field of human sexuality. For example, Febrissy had two experts
testify on his behalf to explain the activities in the video pertaining to BDSM. See People v.
Febrissy, No. C049033, 2006 WL 2006161, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006). There are
many resources available that discuss the variety of different forms of play that people engage
in, as well as guides on how to minimize risk. See generally BRENDA LOVE, THE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF UNUSUAL SEXUAL PRACTICES (1992); WISEMAN, supra note 50.
210 See David DeMatteo et al., Sexual Assault on College Campuses: A 50-State Survey
of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their Relevance to Campus Sexual Assault, 21
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227, 232–36 (2015) (detailing a study of all U.S. state statutes
relating to sexual assault and noting, among other results, how consent was either undefined
or ill-defined, thereby leading to issues in the adjudication of campus sexual assault).
211 See Susan Ehrlich, Post-Penetration Rape: Coercion or Freely Given Consent?, in
DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CONSENT IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 47 (Susan Ehrlich et al.
eds., 2016) (focusing on Maouloud Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App 2007),
as an example of post-penetration rape and how consent must be uncoerced to be considered
consent at all).
212 See id. at 47.
213 Id.
214 THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A
RENEWED CALL TO ACTION 16–18 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de
fault/files/docs/sexual_assault_report-1-21-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3XT-EKK7].
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to allow their partner to do certain things to them even if they say “no” or fight back.215
Depending on how a state constructs their sexual assault laws, a person could be
breaking the law despite the fact that they are doing something their partner has re-
quested them to do.216
Therefore, consent should be inclusive of safewords and safety signals, which
act as another way of withdrawing consent.217 For example, common safewords are
“yellow” (slow down or pause) and “red” (stop completely).218 Partners essentially
negotiate an alternative form of indicating consent and non-consent. However, as
stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, there is nothing in the Constitution that sup-
ports the premise that once consent has been given, it cannot be withdrawn.219 Lawrence
also specified that protecting sodomy as a right under substantive due process is
qualified by the requirement of consent.220 Therefore, BDSM activities that do not
allow a person to withdraw consent would not qualify as a right under Lawrence.
C. Injury
BDSM includes a wide range of various practices, which are then negotiated and
individualized to create an intimate experience for those who choose to engage in
those activities, and there is no end to the creative ways in which people can incor-
porate elements of BDSM in their sexual experiences.221 BDSM can be both physi-
cal and psychological.222 For example, sadomasochism often involves the purposeful
infliction of pain, while domination can be as simple as having a person verbally
direct the physical interaction.223 Some of the activities in BDSM are done in such
a way as to create marks,224 while other activities only induce fear or create pain
without any form of injury.225
215 See WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 52–55. One example of consensual non-consent is
rape-play, where consenting adults will role-play a rape scene; though rape is considered an
abhorrent crime, fantasies about forced sexual intercourse are incredibly common, particularly
amongst women. See Jenny Bivona & Joseph Critelli, The Nature of Women’s Rape Fantasies:
An Analysis of Prevalence, Frequency, and Contents, 46 J. SEX RES. 33, 39, 42 (2009) (conduct-
ing a study where the results indicated that 62% of female undergraduates at two universities
in the southwestern United States have had a rape fantasy).
216 See JILL D. WEINBERG, CONSENSUAL VIOLENCE: SEX, SPORTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
INJURY 5, 11 (2016).
217 WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 54–55.
218 Id. at 52–53.
219 State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 614 (Neb. 2004).
220 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (applying Justice Stevens’s dissenting
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick as the controlling rationale to the case at hand).
221 See Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106.
222 See id. at 106–07.
223 See id.
224 WISEMAN, supra note 50, at 307–10.
225 See Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106–07.
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The state has an interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, includ-
ing from themselves. For example, people do not have a right to commit suicide or
to consent to be killed.226 However, states do not prohibit all of the activities that
cause injury; for example, contact sports, in particular fighting sports like Mixed-
Martial Arts (MMA), are legal (though regulated).227 In general, states rely on the
professional fighting industry to self-regulate to ensure that rules are enforced, rules
that decrease risk and increase the level of safety.228 Criminal liability is therefore
limited, and fighters are allowed to engage in mutual combat as long as they consent
and agree to abide by the rules of the sport.229 Under these circumstances, the law
recognizes a shift in what a person can and cannot consent to, despite the fact that
the risk of injury is high, and the activity can even result in death.230
However, allowing people to consent to engage in mutual combat for sport does
not provide an absolute immunity; though prosecutions are rare, states have sought
to find people criminally liable when they violate the rules of the sport or engage in
a level of violence that exceeds the norms of the sport.231 One of the ways that the
law attempts to differentiate between when a person should be prosecuted for sports
violence is the difference between what is reasonable or unreasonable in the sport
itself, essentially giving legal deference to the self-created rules of the industry.232
A similar construction can be used to assess the legality of a BDSM activity, though
there are a few key differences.
One of the main differences is that BDSM can qualify as a fundamental right
under sexual privacy, whereas contact sports are not a right, but are instead carved out
as an exception to state laws on assault and battery because of their social accept-
ability.233 However, BDSM also differs in both its format and internal regulation; for
example, in MMA fighting, both people are fighting each other.234 However, in BDSM,
many of the activities are one person dominating the other and can involve re-
straints.235 The inability or lack of will to fight back changes the mutuality of the
activity, which can affect what is considered reasonable or unreasonable. Another
226 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2000) (discussing the
history of the right to suicide); State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON
.ORG (Feb. 21, 2017, 12:58 PM PST), http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?re
sourceID=000132 [https://perma.cc/8V5W-LH6C].
227 See generally WEINBERG, supra note 216.
228 Id. at 66–67.
229 Id. at 66.
230 Id. at 65–66.
231 Id. at 93.
232 Id. at 94–95.
233 See id. at 65–67, 93–95.
234 Id. at 66–67.
235 See Hébert & Weaver, supra note 6, at 106–07.
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issue is the concept of internal regulation. Though there are many books, resources,
and classes on how to decrease risk, there is no set manual.236 BDSM communities
have systems in place to increase safety and regulate acceptable and unacceptable
behavior.237 However, the ability to self-police is limited because there are no set
standards that apply to the entire community.238 Private events can, and generally do,
have a list of rules that attendees must follow, though these rules are not universal
and vary by geographic area or the culture of the group.239
The standard for determining the line of protection for BDSM, therefore, must
be different than that which is used for contact sports, though it can be similar. Once
consent has been established, courts can utilize modern legal understandings of
criminal and civil liability, modified to ensure that people still maintain their right
to sexual privacy. Therefore, to assess the physical risks of engaging in BDSM and de-
termine where an act loses protection under sexual privacy, the courts should balance
the consent of the parties involved with the extent of the injury (or potential injury)
received as a result of the activity.
The way in which courts should draw the line between protected and unpro-
tected acts under sexual privacy is whether it requires professional, medical attention.
If the act requires professional medical attention, then courts should examine the
intent of the people involved, in particular the intent of the person who was topping
or inflicting violence onto the injured party.
To simplify this standard, acts can be categorized by determining whether there
is purposeful infliction of pain and whether an injury results in necessary, profes-
sional medical intervention.240 If a private, intimate act is consensual and causes no
pain or injury, then it is protected under the right of sexual privacy. This would in-
clude anal and oral sex, which the Supreme Court has already clarified,241 but could
also include sexual acts involving more than two consenting adults. If there is
purposeful infliction of pain, which means that creating pain is an intentional goal
of the activity, but there is no injury, then this is also protected. This would include
certain types of bondage, where people are consensually restrained, or light impact
play. For these activities, the risk of injury is so small that there is no rational basis
for state regulation, other than moral objection. However, given that sexual privacy
is a fundamental right, the state would have to fulfill a higher burden.242
236 See WEINBERG, supra note 216, at 91–92. See also generally WISEMAN, supra note 50.
237 See WEINBERG, supra note 216, at 69.
238 See id. at 73–74.
239 Id. at 70.
240 See infra Table A.
241 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
242 See generally id.; Jamie Iguchi, Comment, Satisfying Lawrence: The Fifth Circuit
Strikes Ban on Sex Toy Sales, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 655, 669 (2009).
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Even if there is injury, however, if it does not intentionally cause major physical
trauma, internal damage, or death, then likely this will also be protected under sexual
privacy. For example, for many people who participate in sadomasochism, receiving
bruises and abrasions are a vital aspect of the experience.243 Furthermore, within the
context of everyday life, people consent to many different types of activities that can
cause injury, such as contact sports, body modifications, and all sorts of adrenaline-
inducing adventures.244 People are able to consent to a certain level of risk and
injury,245 and this should apply to BDSM as well, particularly since it has a layer of
constitutional protection under sexual privacy.
However, if an injury is severe enough to necessitate professional medical treat-
ment or results in death due to reckless, negligent, knowing, or purposeful behavior,
which is the standard for criminal liability in the Model Penal Code,246 then there should
be legal recourse for criminal or civil liability. Though arguably BDSM could be con-
sidered to inherently meet this standard, the existence of safety precautions, education,
general rules of engagement, and a level of community policing mitigate the stan-
dard. Like in many activities that involve an inherent level of risk, a person loses
their right to engage in the activity if they go beyond the accepted and safe practices
of the activity.247
If it is truly an accident, and all of the reasonable safety precautions were in
place to prevent or reduce the risk of injury, and the person is fully aware when
consenting of the risk of injury, like with any activity, there should be no liability.
However, if a person causes a severe injury because they recklessly mishandle an
instrument or purposefully break someone’s bone, the state’s interest in protecting
its citizens overrides the right to privacy.
243 Though there is little written about this phenomena in academia, visiting kink-related
sites, such as Fetlife.com, reveals a plethora of people who show off their injuries. See
FETLIFE, http://www.fetlife.com [https://perma.cc/U9ZS-PSDS] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
This website is private so that only members have access to its content. As of January 19th,
2018, the Fetlife Terms and Policies still allowed these types of photographs to be posted.
Terms of Use, FETLIFE, https://fetlife.com/legalese/tou [https://perma.cc/DM43-HNPF] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2018). However, it is possible that this may change, as the website has
recently begun to become more strict. See Ellen Scott, Why Did FetLife Remove a Woman’s
Public Photo of Her Period Blood?, METRO (U.K.) (Aug. 11, 2017, 11:17 AM), http://metro
.co.uk/2017/08/11/why-did-fetlife-remove-a-womans-public-photo-of-her-period-blood
-6845025/ [https://perma.cc/DQ2N-8LQC].
244 Just to name a few: boxing, football, roller derby, wrestling, base-jumping, parachuting,
circus-performing, skateboarding, piercings, tattoos, ice-skating, etc.
245 See supra notes 233–43 and accompanying text; see also WEINBERG, supra note 216,
at 94–95 (discussing, in part, consent to the violent contact sport MMA).
246 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW. INST. 1985).
247 For example, if a fighter participating in MMA has their nose broken during a fight,
the other fighter would not face assault charges; however, if the bell rings indicating the fight
is over, and then a fighter walks over and breaks another fighter’s nose, that would be an as-
sault. Cf. WEINBERG, supra note 216, at 93.
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V. APPLICATION: THE TEST AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
How exactly would this test work if applied to various sexual practices, includ-
ing BDSM? This section will analyze several different scenarios to both explain the
test and the legal impacts of recognizing BDSM, and other sexual activities, under
the right to sexual privacy. This common-sense approach is designed to accurately
reflect the reality of the complexity of the intimate relationships between adults.
Hypothetical scenario 1: A state has a law outlawing homosexual sodomy. Two
adult men, in the privacy of their own bedroom, engage in anal sex and are caught
by police. They are charged and convicted of homosexual sodomy.
The test proposed in this Note is designed to fit the precedent set by the Supreme
Court in Lawrence, where the Court recognized a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy under sexual privacy.248 Therefore, this scenario should easily qualify under
the test. First, both of the men involved were adults. They engaged in a sexual act in
the privacy of their own home. Second, they both consented to participate in the act.
Third, was there a risk of severe bodily injury that necessitated professional medical
treatment or resulted in death? In general, sodomy has a very low risk of injury, and
specifically in this instance there was no severe injury. Therefore, this act would
qualify as a protected act under sexual privacy.
Hypothetical scenario 2: Neighbors hear what sounds like someone being hit
in the apartment next door. Police investigate and the couple admit that they were
engaging in consensual BDSM. The dominant male partner, who had been hitting
a submissive female partner with a wooden paddle, is arrested and charged with
assault. During the trial, the judge instructs the jury that assault does not contain an
element of consent, and therefore if they find that the defendant hit his partner, they
must find him guilty. He is subsequently convicted.
In this scenario, two adult partners engaged in BDSM activity in the privacy of
their home. During the investigation, both partners indicated that they consented to
the activity. Finally, though there was the purposeful infliction of pain, and a wooden
paddle is capable of inflicting an injury, there is no evidence that the activity required
any form of professional, medical treatment. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the dominant was utilizing the tool in a way that could recklessly cause injury. Here,
this conviction should be overturned because the application of the assault statute
violated the right to sexual privacy by barring the use of a defense of consent.
Hypothetical scenario 3: Two adults meet over the internet and agree to engage
in BDSM play in a hotel room. The dominant partner explains to the submissive that
they do not believe in limits. Therefore, no safeword will be used and once they begin
the submissive cannot leave for any reason.249 The submissive consents. The dominant
248 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
249 This scenario is partially based on a real-life case that, at the time this Note was being writ-
ten, was being investigated by Australian authorities. A man called “The Wolf” is alleged to have
sexually assaulted dozens of women under the guise of BDSM and consensual non-consent.
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restrains and rapes the submissive, punching the submissive in the face when they
attempt to escape. This results in a broken jaw and large facial abrasions.
Several issues in this scenario would disqualify it from any form of protection
under sexual privacy. Though both participants were adults engaging in a sexual act
in the privacy of a hotel room, meeting the threshold, the act itself would not pass
scrutiny. First, the level of consent would not qualify because there was no ability
to withdraw consent. Second, when the submissive attempted to withdraw consent,
the dominant did not stop, which means that every action after the attempt to with-
draw consent (in the absence of an alternatively negotiated signal) was a form of
assault. Third, the dominant used a closed fist to punch the submissive in the face,
which would likely be, at the very least, a reckless form of impact play. This is evi-
denced by the resulting injury, a broken jaw, which would necessitate professional
medical intervention. Therefore, the perpetrator can and should be held criminally
and/or civilly liable for these actions.
Hypothetical scenario 4: A local BDSM community leader in Virginia hosts
BDSM parties at their private home on a monthly basis. Virginia has a law that out-
laws “bawdy houses.”250 At this party, adults engage openly in sexual and BDSM
activity. Identification is checked to ensure that all attendees are over the age of 18,
and the house has trained, volunteer “dungeon monitors” to keep an eye out for safety
issues and consent violations. The house has strict rules, including the universal use
of “red” to mean stop. People take turns utilizing various stations to play with their
partners, who are generally semi- or fully naked.
The police have heard of this house and, determining that it fits the definition
of a bawdy house, decide to raid it. During a party, the police enter the home and
arrest every attendee, charging each with attending a bawdy house. Furthermore, any-
one who was caught in the act of engaging in BDSM activity as the top or dominant
is arrested for assault. Police body cameras have video footage of this. The district
attorney, who has a strong moral stance against BDSM and alternative sexual activity,
is committed to pressing charges and humiliating the attendees in the process, by
releasing their legal names to the press.
Here, consenting adults engaged in intimate, sexual activities and/or recognized
categories of kink. The activities were, at least from what the police could see, com-
pletely consensual. Furthermore, none of the participants had injuries that required
See generally Ben McClellan & Ian Paterson, Accused BDSM Rapist “The Wolf” Unveiled




250 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-347 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to keep any
bawdy place, or to reside in or at or visit, for immoral purposes, any such bawdy place. . . . As
used in this Code, “bawdy place” shall mean any place within or without any building or
structure which is used or is to be used for lewdness, assignation or prostitution.”).
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medical intervention. Furthermore, the house had extra safety precautions in place
to decrease the risk of its attendees. Therefore, no one should have been charged with
a crime because they were all engaging in constitutionally protected activity. Unless
the police have evidence that a particular person had their consent violated or was seri-
ously injured, arresting and prosecuting the participants is a violation of their rights.
Furthermore, the law itself should be deemed unconstitutional, because its broad-
ness includes activities that people have a right to engage in. The exception would
be prostitution, which is not a right under sexual privacy.251 However, in the privacy
of one’s own home, people should have the right to engage in BDSM activities, not
only with a single partner, but with a group of people as well.252 However, if this
house was charging admission fees, the event is less likely to be contained within
the private sphere.253 I would argue that states can regulate public events where BDSM
activities are taking place because people lose the constitutional protection of sexual
privacy, though there may be other compelling arguments, such as First Amendment
and the freedom of speech.
Hypothetical scenario five: A married couple is getting a divorce. They have
two children and the custody proceedings are acrimonious, to say the least. While
married, they engaged in a Dominant/submissive relationship that included sadomas-
ochistic play. Specifically, the dominant spouse would beat the submissive spouse
with various instruments and would write derogatory terms on their body. After-
wards, they would take pictures of the submissive spouse. These images showed
ripped clothing, dark bruises and bleeding, and smeared makeup, evidence of crying.
The couple frequently journaled their experiences publicly online, and those writing
indicate that the submissive fully consented and, in fact, asked for this treatment.
Now that the relationship has soured, the submissive partner is threatening to
reveal these photos to the police and the judge so that they can get full custody of
the children. The children were never exposed to any of the BDSM activity, and it
did not affect their upbringing or mental health.
Here, because the BDSM activities constitute an assault, technically the domi-
nant spouse engaged in an illegal activity.254 Therefore, the risk of revealing their
consensual sadomasochistic activities is labeling the dominant partner a criminal,
251 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating that this case did not involve prostitution as part
of its ruling).
252 In terms of policy, this can actually make these parties safer. Currently, these parties
are generally held in secret, and so when problems do arise, such as consent violations or serious
injury, participants are fearful of calling police or emergency services. Victims may fear re-
porting what has happened to them, for fear of both reprisal from the community for “outing”
its members and from the police, who could arrest them for committing a crime. See generally
WEINBERG, supra note 216; WISEMAN, supra note 50.
253 Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating that the Constitution protects homosexuals’
right to engage in sexual conduct in their private residences).
254 Cf. People v. Davidson, No. D064880, 2015 WL 4751166 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015);
People v. Febrissy, No. C049033, 2006 WL 2006161 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006).
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which would absolutely impact the custody proceedings, despite the fact that both
partners were doing it together. This also opens up the dominant partner to being
blackmailed because of the risk of arrest.
Under this test, these issues would be mitigated because, as a constitutionally
protected activity, BDSM would not automatically be criminal. The court could still
weigh the fact that both partners engaged in BDSM when determining custody,
because all relevant factors should be used to make a decision in the children’s best
interest. If the children were exposed to the dynamic, it would be very important for
the court to know that they could be exposed to further risk. However, under these
circumstances, two adults engaged in private, consensual BDSM activities, but only
one is exposed to legal risk for criminal activity (the dominant), while the other is
labeled a victim (the submissive) and given potentially preferential treatment. This
is an unjust outcome, compared to treating BDSM as a sexual preference without the
stigma of criminality.
CONCLUSION
Sexuality is an important aspect of human dignity. It defines our lives, our rela-
tionships, and our identities. As BDSM enters the mainstream of public discourse and
consciousness, the law must adapt to ensure that justice ultimately prevails. Though
recognizing that sexual privacy applies to activities other than homosexuality is an
important first step, there are other areas of the law that also need to be developed
in order to adapt to the increasing number of people openly engaging in BDSM.
Several areas of the law include the investigation and prosecution of obscenity, civil
lawsuits involving torts or defamation, family law and child custody, and the regu-
lation of BDSM clubs, events, and venues.
It was only about 30 years ago that the Supreme Court determined that states
could interfere in the private, sexual lives of consenting adults.255 In just 17 years,
the Court reversed that decision, and rightfully held that the government should not,
and cannot, ban adults from engaging in sexual practices that are central to their iden-
tity, relationships, and freedom.256 This test creates a consistent way to determine
whether an activity is protected under sexual privacy. Its flexibility ensures that a
wide range of human sexual activity is protected, while also allowing states to pro-
tect its citizens.
Courts should continue to uphold sexual privacy, and give practitioners of BDSM
protection under the law. Not only is it required under the Constitution, but it can
help reduce the shame and stigma of alternative sexualities. This, in turn, will lead
to greater safety, better understandings of consent, and protection from persecution.
255 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
256 See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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Table A
Necessary elements: Consent: Injury:
1. All people engaged in
the activity are adults
2. The act is private















infliction of pain, no
injury
2. Purposeful infliction
of pain, but no injury
3. Purposeful infliction
of pain and injury that




4. Injury that requires
professional, medical
intervention or death

